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In this working paper I will trace the changes undergone by anonymity – and by the discourses 
surrounding it – in liberal Western societies. I will ask whether the current politicization of the 
issue is likely to have any impact on the gradual disappearance of opportunities for anonymity that 
we are currently witnessing and argue that anonymity is an ambivalent but critical feature of the 
democratic public sphere. The argument proceeds in three stages. I begin with a number of 
conceptual observations on anonymity. From these, a heuristic framework emerges with which the 
changes in anonymous communication, and in the role this communication plays in society, can 
be described. I then analyse the extent to which options for anonymity have been affected by the 
revolution in information and communication technologies and conclude by considering how 
anonymity is framed in public discourse and what impacts this has. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In May 2015 David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, submitted his first report to the Human Rights Council 
(Kaye 2015). In it, he focused on the issues of encryption and anonymity, highlighting the 
important role these play in regard to privacy and the right to free expression. The mere fact that 
such a report has been produced, and the debate it has engendered, are indicative of the high 
profile which the issue of anonymity has recently acquired. Anonymity itself is, of course, nothing 
new in human history and has long been recognized as posing problems and providing solutions in 
a number of domains (investigative journalism and the handling of medical data are two such 
areas). But the intensity of the current debate has shown just how little we actually know about 
anonymity – either as a normative concept or as an everyday practice. It is only in the wake of the 
digital turn that the topic has become politicized, in other words has been transformed from a 
largely unmanaged determinant of social communication into a political issue. Until the late 1990s, 
there was a near-total absence of academic literature examining anonymity from a political point 
of view. Since the digital turn, this situation has changed radically. Discourse on the topic is now 
not just a scholarly but also a political battleground and anonymity is widely portrayed as a 
cornerstone of the (normative) order governing our digital lives. 
In this working paper I will trace the changes undergone by anonymity – and by the discourses 
surrounding it – in liberal Western societies. I will ask whether the current politicization of the 
issue is likely to have any impact on the gradual disappearance of opportunities for anonymity that 
we are currently witnessing. I will argue that anonymity is an ambivalent but critical feature of the 
democratic public sphere. Political, technical, economic and social developments have undermined 
the broad de facto anonymity of modern societies. If we want to slow down or halt this trend, or 
actually reverse it, it will not be enough simply to politicize ‘de-anonymizing’ tendencies and whip 
up indignation at them. Only a radical overhaul of the governance-architecture through which we 
address and regulate the many issues affecting the transnational digital public will enable us to 
counter this powerful trend. All aspects – legal, political and economic – must be tackled 
simultaneously. 
My argument proceeds in three stages. I begin with a number of conceptual observations on 
anonymity. From these, a heuristic framework emerges with which the changes in anonymous 
communication, and in the role this communication plays in society, can be described. I then 
analyse the extent to which options for anonymity have been affected by the revolution in 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) and I conclude by considering how 
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anonymity is framed in public discourse and what impacts this has. My aim in this last section is to 
show that none of the different layers of the anonymity discourse that have taken shape so far have 
generated any cogent ideas as to how the all-encompassing trend to de-anonymization outlined in 
the second part of the paper might be tackled. If we are to succeed in countering this trend, we will 
have to adopt a more political and institutional mode of thinking. We will need to address 
overarching issues relating to Internet governance and the inscription of values into digital 
infrastructures. 
2. ANONYMITY: CONCEPTUAL OBSERVATIONS1 
The word ‘anonymity’ literally means a condition of namelessness. But given that a name is only 
one – actually quite unreliable – identifier of a person, focusing on its absence does not exhaust the 
meaning of the concept of anonymity. A better way to understand the concept is to set it in a 
broader context of social communication. Viewed thus, ‘anonymity’ describes a situation of 
intersubjective action in which it is not possible either to conclusively attribute a particular action 
or communication to an individual or subject or to render an individual or subject accessible/ 
responsible. Greater precision can be introduced into this broad definition if we take into account 
four closely interrelated facts. 
Firstly, anonymity always relates to the question ‘Who?’ It thus points to the combination of 
action/communication and actor. The ‘what’ – in other words the object or content of the 
action/communication – can be known, provided it too gives no clue to identity. Anonymity 
relates to the meta-information level, not to the level of information itself.2 
Secondly, anonymity is situational in nature. It is not a characteristic of a person; it is the product 
of an intersubjective constellation and of the possibility/impossibility of identifying an actor in that 
constellation beyond the immediate context. This being the case, it is also an impermanent 
condition, always tied to specific, delimitable actions which themselves are visible as actions and 
produce effects. (Anonymity is therefore also distinct from invisibility.) 
Thirdly, although anonymity can be produced intentionally (through disguise, for example, or the 
use of a pseudonym), it can also arise de facto from a situation (as when one finds oneself in a 
crowd). The essence of anonymity lies in indistinguishability and anonymity therefore only 
succeeds where there are multiple possible authors of an action. This being so, anonymity also 
always depends, at least indirectly, on others’ accepting it and exercising restraint – by not insisting 
on identification, for example, or by not attempting to single out those performing an action. To 
this extent, anonymity is always uncertain and gradual. No individual can be sure that their action/ 
communication will in fact play out anonymously – especially since the possibility of identification 
persists after, or indeed arises from, the action/communication. Anonymity thus always remains 
open-ended. Strengthening it would mean taking measures that rendered identification more 
difficult – by, for example, removing information from a situation. 
The upshot of this, fourthly, is that anonymity is best understood and analysed in terms of its 
opposite – identification. Where an action or communication can be traced back to a subject 
susceptible of identification beyond the immediate context, the state of anonymity ceases to obtain. 
1  On the wider debate as to how best to conceptualize anonymity, see Marx (1999); Nissenbaum (1999); Wallace (1999); 
Rössler (2003); Matthews (2010), and Ponesse (2014). 
2  This is important when it comes to the debate about digital structural transformation, because the discussion about 
anonymity is directly related to the discussion about encryption, which has perhaps garnered even more interest. 
Although the two discussions often coincide – because content can also provide information about speakers and vice 
versa – the distinction between ‘who’ and ‘what’ or between information and meta-information will be maintained here 
for analytical purposes and attention will be focused solely on the discussion about anonymity. 
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Hence, anyone wishing to ascertain whether/to what degree anonymity exists in a particular 
situation must establish to what extent and by whom identification is possible.3 
With these observations in mind, we can set about constructing a heuristic framework that will 
help us plot the course of anonymity in liberal societies. To do this, we must first draw two 
distinctions. 
The first differentiates horizontal from vertical anonymity. ‘Horizontal anonymity’ refers to 
anonymity in regard to peers and immediate surroundings. Such anonymity obtains where one is 
not, or cannot be, identified by those observing a particular act or conversation. This is the 
situation, for example, in a café or bar, where we tend not to know the people around us and have 
no way of finding out who they are short of asking them to identify themselves. ‘Vertical 
anonymity’, by contrast, refers to anonymity vis-à-vis well-resourced entities. Most notable 
amongst these are states, which have a broad range of means available to them to identify people, 
both as a situation occurs and after it. Such actors do not have to be present in the situation in 
order to make an identification. 
This chronological aspect points to the second distinction, which relates to the fact that anonymity 
is not contained within present time and has necessarily also to look to the future. Being 
unidentified in a particular situation is different from being (or at least feeling) protected against 
later identification. We would not, for example, describe communication as anonymous if we were 
aware that it was possible, or even likely, that we would later be identified.4 Our second distinction 
is therefore that between identification (which puts an end to anonymity within a situation) and 
identifiability (which implies/anticipates that anonymity can be maintained beyond that situation). 
Whereas identification mostly has to be done overtly (a person presenting ID to board a plane is 
aware that they are not maintaining their anonymity), identifiability can be achieved without the 
knowledge or consent of those whose anonymity is being breached. Being aware of the possibility 
of later identification often prevents us from acting as if we were anonymous. It is possible actively 
to secure anonymity by introducing (effective, non-reversible) anonymizing procedures that 
restrict identifiability. 
These two distinctions in themselves provide us with enough of a conceptual apparatus to trace the 
development of anonymity over recent times. Before we do this, however, we need to make a short 
detour through normative territory. Anonymity is, after all, most often discussed in relation to 
whether we have cause to fear either its spread or its demise. If, as previously proposed, anonymity 
is highly dependent on intersubjective constellations and situational specifics, mounting a hardline 
defence of it (for example, according it the status of a human right) or, alternatively, banning it 
altogether would seem to be equally unpromising approaches. Normative evaluations of 
anonymity generally take the form of discussions about the presumed effects of anonymous 
communication. Although the language in these debates is normatively charged and seemingly of a 
general nature, these set-tos are better thought of as clashes between differing empirical 
expectations (examples of the kinds of contributions involved include: Akdeniz 2002; Baumann 
2013; Pettit 2008; Brodnig 2013; Doyle/Veranas 2014; Gardner 2011; Christopherson 2007; 
Davenport 2002; Lim et al. 2011). The optimistic camp holds that facilitating anonymous 
communication will engender authenticity since power-relations can then be ignored and the 
3  In this connection, it should be noted that anonymity, whilst closely related to privacy, is not reducible to it, nor is it simply 
a subordinate aspect of it. Thus privacy can be maintained even where identification is possible. In many ways privacy has 
more to do with issues of access and the control of information whereas anonymity is concerned with identification and 
linkage. Anonymity can serve as a powerful bulwark to privacy – including, most relevantly here, privacy of information in 
the digital domain – but it should be understood and discussed as distinct from it (Ponesse 2014). 
4  This extension of anonymity into the future is one of the reasons why anonymity must be thought of as necessarily 
relative and gradual. One can never definitively exclude the possibility of being identified post eventum. Whilst all 
anonymization-techniques are capable of failing, the possibility of their doing so can be greater or less and – even more 
importantly – it is the likelihood or not of de-anonymization occurring that really drives behaviour. 
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individual will be able to speak freely and openly. The pessimists, by contrast, believe that giving 
up the possibility of holding someone to account will foster irresponsible and anti-social 
behaviour. These two sets of expectations are then tied into broader normative and/or theoretical 
debates such as those on privacy (where anonymity can be seen either as crucial to the creation of 
an inviolable personal sphere or as likely to foster negative behaviour such as hate-speech) and 
those on democracy (where anonymity may figure either as a necessary bulwark against the state 
or as a mechanism that can both facilitate collective action and undermine public discourse). The 
fact that both sides have a wealth of anecdotal evidence to draw on suggests that rather than 
treating anonymity as being of value in and of itself, we should look at it in specific contexts 
(Gardner 2011). Indeed, to regard anonymity as being of inherent worth would seem, quite 
manifestly, to be a category-error. 
This being the case, rather than taking the abstract route and discussing potential effects of 
anonymous communication, I shall follow the heuristic framework established above and trace 
developments in the possibilities for such communication in society. By establishing what has 
changed and why, we get a different view of what these developments entail and of what lessons 
might be learned as regards addressing them. 
3. BUG OR FEATURE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANONYMOUS 
COMMUNICATION SINCE THE DIGITAL TURN5 
Guided by the conceptual framework laid down in the first section, we can now analyse the 
fortunes of anonymity since the digital turn. To do this, we first need to ascertain the nature of 
anonymity – or more precisely of the options for anonymous communication – prior to these 
events. Before we can focus on the specific scope and structure of anonymity in Western liberal 
societies in the period in question – from, say, the 1950s to the 1980s – we have to turn our 
attention to the abstract matter of historical representation. 
Chronicles of the modern age have often depicted it as an age of anonymity. In these accounts, the 
accelerated pace of life and the spread of impersonal modes of production and communication 
brought about by the Industrial Revolution are seen as precipitating the demise of community-life. 
Bureaucracy, pluralism and urban living are characterized as anonymous and are contrasted with 
trust-based communication in small-scale communities. (Even early scholars of sociology such as 
Weber, Durkheim and Simmel noted the ambivalent nature of this transition from community to 
society.) In modern society, anonymity has been experienced as negative but at the same time 
inevitable. It has come to be seen as a necessary by-product of the ongoing growth and 
differentiation of societies. Thus, although anonymity continues to be generally perceived as 
problematic – not just, as might be expected, by those who hold conservative world-views but also 
by the proponents of many, indeed most, progressive or emancipatory philosophies, which see 
solidarity as a potential counter to alienation – there has, at the same time, been a ‘normalization’ 
of anonymous communication. This finds expression in many of the practices and communication 
infrastructures of modern societies. Functional equivalents have been developed that aim to offset 
the drawbacks of impersonal communication. One such is juridification, which enables trust to be 
established in non-personalized communication-settings. Still speaking from an abstract 
standpoint, we also see that in the early debates, anonymity was mostly seen as relating to social 
structures. The conception of it as something individual and situational, and something one might 
voluntarily embrace, only emerges at a later stage. 
Against this background, what is the situation of anonymous communication in pre-digital 
societies? Two facts stand out from the above account: firstly, anonymity is a feature of society that 
5  I use ‘digital turn’ to refer to the profound changes brought about by the rise of ICTs. I date the turn to the 1990s: over 
the course of that decade, the proportion of information stored digitally rose from 10% to 90%. 
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points to broad development rather than intentional design; and secondly, anonymity is focused 
on the horizontal dimension, in other words on peer-to-peer relations. Staying anonymous in a 
public setting is easily achieved, given that peers are not obliged to identify themselves and it is not 
difficult to withhold information. Unless one is in a position of privilege, attempting to establish 
someone’s identity is not only costly; it also violates social and legal norms. That said, there are (at 
least) two mechanisms in operation that modulate anonymity here. The first is the set of social 
norms which dictate that people identify themselves in certain communication-based settings 
(thus, not to introduce oneself is considered rude in the context of a formal conversation but not in 
a transaction at a news stand). The second is the presence of powerful ‘gatekeepers’ (such as media 
concerns) who control access to the wider public sphere (one-to-many communications), not only 
demanding identification but whittling the right of entry down even further by restricting it to the 
well-known or newsworthy. 
Anonymity of the vertical kind also has a relatively robust profile in the pre-digital period. 
Although there are specific areas – such as travel and taxation – in which identification has long 
been mandatory and strictly enforced, outside of these contexts even well-resourced players 
exercise restraint in seeking to establish identity: besides being costly, it is a task that is feasible 
only for a limited number of individuals and has to be performed more or less openly (for 
example, with a straight request to the person). Whereas authoritarian regimes are keen 
proliferators of ID-checking opportunities, liberal states have come to recognize, and indeed to 
embrace, the limitations in this area. Vertically speaking also, identification has long been chiefly a 
matter for states and governments (in terms both of enforcement and of post eventum 
verification). Corporate actors play only a minor role here and are only able or inclined to enforce 
identification in very special circumstances. They do not have the means to identify consumers 
individually, nor is it vital to their commercial interests to do so. 
A visual summary of the observations made so far is given in Figure 1. This points up the centrality 
of de facto anonymity in modern societies before the digital turn. Private, public and political 
spaces are mostly constituted in ways conducive to the preservation of anonymity (provided this 
preservation does not entail the breaking of certain written and unwritten rules). Particular 
privileged individuals – such as officials and celebrities – are excepted from these conventions (at 
least when they are moving in the public sphere) and any attempt to access a wider public brings 
with it a requirement for identification. At the same time, there are only a handful of actors capable 
of breaching anonymity and curtailing the privacy it can afford to individuals moving in public 
spaces. Any actors (states, for example) who do seek to ‘unmask’ an individual are often 
constrained by laws and social norms or deterred by the high cost and visibility of identification-
procedures. Even though anonymity, and the possibility of anonymous communication, is deeply 
inscribed in the societies of this period, the notion itself is viewed as negative and dangerous. As a 
result, social and legal norms aim chiefly to delimit anonymous spaces and tend to frame 










PRIF Working Paper No. 38 
6 
 
 Identification Identifiability 
Horizontal communication - Regulated by social norms 
- Strong gatekeepers enforce 
identifiable communication in 
the wider public context 
- Weak 
- Basically restricted to 
the immediate 
environment 
Vertical communication - Highly context-specific 
- Enforcement mainly by the 
state 
- Explicit and visible 
- Low to medium 
- Very costly and 
resource-intensive 
- Mostly limited to states 
Figure 1. Anonymous communication before the digital turn. 
How, then, has the rise of ICTs influenced the discourse in this area and what effect has it had on 
the opportunities for anonymous communication? As early as 1993, in one of the best-known 
cartoons of the nascent Internet age, Peter Steiner pictured two dogs in front of a computer, one of 
whom was saying to the other “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog”. This image sums up 
what the Internet and ICTs were thought to be doing to social communication – namely, 
accelerating its de-personalization. 
Just from a technical point of view, the cartoon makes sense: since digital communications have to 
be translated into bits and bytes and then transferred via a decentralized network using numbers 
and protocols, every instance of such communication is in some sense pseudonymous. This 
circumstance brings with it a host of possibilities for covering one’s tracks – a tendency further 
encouraged by the fact that such transactions are not tied to a particular time or space. As a result 
of these factors, early perceptions of digital communication assumed a wide gap between ‘the real 
world’ and ‘cyberspace’. In the latter, different norms seem to apply; social conventions and 
obligations appear less binding and less susceptible of legal enforcement. In or own times, trolling 
and hate speech – both closely linked to anonymity – continue to be presented in these terms. In 
digital environments there is also a diminution in the status of gatekeepers. Communication with 
large audiences becomes possible even for those who do not want to disclose their identity (still a 
fairly common occurrence on Twitter, for example). 
The view that the digital revolution has facilitated and normalized anonymous communication 
with a broad public is widespread and has been reinforced by changes in the shape of collective 
action, which has seen the demotion of intermediary organizations and the rise of individualized 
‘personal action frames’ (Shirky 2008; Bennett/Segerberg 2013). (This trend is perhaps most 
strikingly exemplified in the ‘Anonymous’ protest-movement and its emblem of a Guy Fawkes 
mask.) Even so, I wish to argue that the assumption that digitalization fosters anonymity is 
misguided and does not take sufficient account of the further shifts that have occurred in technical 
infrastructure and political and social context.  
3.1 Three De-Anonymizing Trends are of Critical Significance in this Regard. 
The first is technological. The current ubiquity, locational capability and 24/7 operation of 
technological devices seriously expand the potential for identification. Mobile computing 
precludes the levels of anonymous communication that were possible with stationary set-ups. 
Similarly, the increased potential for storing and analysing data has hamstrung anonymization-
strategies to the point where attempts to resolve the tensions between big data and privacy through 
measures based on anonymity and consent are breaking down completely (Barocas/Nissenbaum 
2014; Ohm 2010). 
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The second trend is economic and involves a massive shift in the incentives for de-anonymization. 
In a digitalized economy, identity becomes a driver of profits – a situation aptly summed up in 
descriptions of data as the new gold or new oil (Kurz/Rieger 2011; Simanowski 2014). Alongside a 
growth in data-mining, there has been a rise in the kinds of information-monopolies that thrive on 
economies of scale and hence are hard to forgo (Dean 2005; Suarez-Villa 2009; Sevignani 2013). In 
addition, new modes of digital communication – apps, streaming, SaaS (‘software as a service’), 
and so on – reinforce the ‘identification and registration’ logic and erode the notion of digital data 
as impersonal and endlessly reproducible (Bunz 2004). All these developments shift electronic 
communication out of individual control and make it dependent on intermediaries who make vast 
profits from analysing behaviour and personalizing their offers accordingly. 
The third de-anonymizing trend results from changes in social practice, notably the rise of social 
networking, with its inbuilt spur to self-portrayal and its (often forced) reduction to a single fixed 
identity across the Net (Andrejevic 2011; Lovink 2011). Mirroring these developments are various 
political attempts to make the web more ‘secure’ – by, for example, requiring verification of 
identity in all sorts of digital settings. (A significant example here is the introduction by many 
countries of mandatory ID verification in Internet cafes – one of several trends linking real and 
online identities – see Farrall 2012.) 
Together with other developments currently taking place, these trends are resulting in anonymous 
communication becoming much harder to achieve. Using our heuristic framework, we can 
determine where the relevant changes have occurred. In the horizontal dimension, the changes to 
anonymity have been less far-reaching and, in terms of the present account, of less relevance than 
those in the vertical dimension. Although the possibilities for anonymous interaction appear, at 
first glance, to have multiplied (thanks to chat rooms, Twitter, and so on), and although the 
importance of gatekeepers in facilitating access to the broader public sphere has diminished, 
people’s presence in social networks, and the data trails they leave behind on the open Internet, 
have in fact brought an increase in identifiability. Identification remains context-dependent and 
we see a simultaneous proliferation of contexts where all participants to a conversation are 
identified (as on Facebook) and contexts that permit peer-to-peer anonymity. It is the discourse 
surrounding horizontal anonymity that has largely shaped our public conception of the Internet as 
a place where anonymity is still possible but may also pose a problem. 
Of much greater significance are the changes relating to vertical anonymity, where the shifts have 
been not only more substantial but also distinctly one-sided. The requirement for identification 
has become much more widespread and is now often mandatory for those seeking access to digital 
communication-platforms. The result has been a proliferation in the number of private actors who 
are able – and motivated – to enforce identification. States have similarly extended their reach – 
not least by developing means of gaining access to, and combining, private data-collections. 
Because the digital public sphere is almost entirely privately owned and because the corporations 
that grant access to it have enormous leverage when it comes to collecting all kinds of personal 
data, identifiability has burgeoned. At the same time, technological change has increased the 
capacity for data-analysis to such an extent that finding a technical solution that would reconcile 
big data and privacy has effectively been ruled out (Barocas/Nissenbaum 2014). 
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Figure 2 sums up these changes and allows comparison with conditions prior to the rise of ICTs. 
 Identification Identifiability 
Horizontal communication - Steady or decreasing 
- Weakening of social 
pressures 
- Medium 
Vertical communication - Many contexts require 
identification or set it as a 
default 
- More actors are able to 
enforce identification 
- Medium to high 
- Low costs 
- Easy to hide 
Figure 2. Anonymous communication after the digital turn. 
To sum up: over recent decades, the modalities of anonymous communication have undergone 
major change. Although this process has been a complex one, driven by many different factors and 
trends, the shift away from de facto anonymity and towards a ‘goldfish-bowl’ society has been 
unmistakable (Froomkin 2015). One particularly salient feature has been the growth in the 
identificatory powers wielded by well-resourced actors (whether states or private players). Given 
the added incentive which the falling costs of data storage and processing have created for 
generating personalized data, there seems little likelihood of this trend being reversed – 
particularly at a time when, in addition, the distinction between the online and offline world is 
increasingly being blurred. Anonymity is not something we achieve simply by switching off our 
computers (or mobiles or other devices): digitalization is all-pervading, even if we do have some 
power to shape it (Floridi 2014). 
4. THE POLITICIZATION OF ANONYMITY 
Having outlined the general trends affecting anonymity, I would now like to narrow the focus and 
try to determine to what extent and in what ways these developments have been addressed in 
public discourse in liberal societies. As the present volume impressively demonstrates, the concepts 
and convictions surrounding privacy have undergone enormous change in recent decades. 
Consequently, if we are to understand governance in this area, we need to analyse the various shifts 
and struggles in public discourse. Efforts at governance and regulation in this area cannot be 
understood solely by looking at (external) challenges such as changes in technological capacity. 
They need to be analysed against the backdrop of changing expectations and demands. Anonymity 
is of particular interest in this regard: as noted previously, it is not something that can be treated as 
an absolute and is not viewed in an entirely positive light; at the same time, because the shifts in 
both the horizontal and vertical dimensions are seen and felt so widely, it has acquired a high 
profile in public discourse. Any attempt to counter the structural pulls that have diminished the 
possibility of anonymous communication must therefore include an appreciation of the 
argumentative landscape and not just deplore the changes. With this in mind, what I propose to do 
in the rest of this paper is to gauge how far attempts to politicize anonymity have been successful 
and whether there is any likelihood of current trends (particularly the diminution of vertical 
anonymity) being halted or reversed.  
Before I embark on this task, a few remarks on terminology are in order. As I use it here, 
‘politicization’ will not have the restricted meaning of getting an issue onto the agendas of political 
decision-makers. Nor will it be used in the sense of the extreme polarization of an issue. (Both of 
these are very common understandings of the concept.) Instead, I shall use the term in the 
‘republican’ sense of a topic of public discourse that gives rise to a variety of alternative positions 
and is amenable to, and stands in need of, political resolution. Interpreted thus, politicization is 
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not restricted to professional politics; it also relates to the type, quality and variety of arguments in 
the public sphere. From a normative point of view, politicization is here conceptualized as 
inherently positive, since reflexivity is encouraged (rather than discouraged), social conflicts are 
articulated, and inclusion is made possible. Empirically too, this interpretation of politicization 
may have its advantages, given that acceptance becomes likelier and solutions can be verified by 
argumentation before they are implemented. That said, politicization does not mean that policies 
necessarily change, only that they become the object of contestation. 
In what follows, I pick out four areas in which the issue of anonymity has become politicized – but 
has done so in very different ways. I will show what arguments and positions have taken shape and 
whether success in politicization has had any impact on the meta-trend of diminishing 
opportunities for anonymous communication. The four areas I have selected – technical, 
economic, legal and socio-political – suggest themselves from my previous analysis of the push-
factors operating here. As I will explain, interest in issues of anonymous communication has 
grown in all four areas but the growth in each case has taken very different turns. My purpose is 
not to carry out a comprehensive discourse-analysis and map the entire argumentative field. What 
I am aiming for, rather, is an anecdotal overview that may serve as a starting-point for a more 
thorough empirical investigation. 
The Technical Domain 
Of the different discursive domains, this is undoubtedly the one in which anonymity has been 
around the longest as an issue. Anonymity has been a concern from the early days of the Internet 
and sensitivity to changes in the normative fabric and the institutional and technical infrastructure 
of the Net is widespread amongst members of what is an active civil society of hackers, privacy 
advocates and the like (for an overview of digital civil society, see Bennett 2008 and Beckedahl 
2015). At the same time, as explained earlier, underlying technical conditions have changed 
enormously as a result of the growth in networked communications and the commercialization of 
the Internet. The idea of Internet exceptionalism has had its day and the endeavour to maintain 
extensive anonymity finds itself up against the interests of those whose influence is on the rise in 
all things cyber. 
Notwithstanding these developments, the technical basis of the Internet – protocols, routing logic, 
and so on – still leaves considerable room for anonymization. This means that every attempt to 
enforce personalized, verified identification necessitates the creation and acceptance of additional 
layers of communication. Cookies are one example of this – and also illustrate the characteristic ‘cat 
and mouse’ game in which identification mechanisms are created and then repeatedly circumvented 
and refined. In order to secure acceptance of these kinds of identification-mechanisms, the 
organizations concerned have mostly avoided directly raising the issue of anonymity, instead 
focusing on the benefits of identification (ease of use, elimination of the need for log-in, etc.). 
Nowadays, many services are available only to registered users and the processes used for verification 
are much more advanced. As already indicated, mobile technology and the app economy have been 
game-changers in this respect: log-ins here are often permanent and much more meta-data – notably 
regarding location – is collected by default (often with no real opt-out facility). 
This re-shaping of online communications has been met with vocal opposition. It has also 
triggered the development of alternatives that subvert or supplement the offers described above. 
Examples here include alternative social networks such as Diaspora, web-anonymizers such as 
JonDo, and other (mostly peer-to-peer) infrastructures. Probably the most significant endeavour 
in this regard is TOR (The Onion Router), an anonymization network which one of the NSA slides 
leaked by Edward Snowden described as ‘the king of high-secure, low-latency Internet anonymity’. 
The Snowden revelations fuelled interest in TOR and in encryption technology, but the public 
reaction has been mixed. 
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Within public discourse, technical solutions that offer anonymity are mostly framed as a form of 
justified civilian self-defence. Anonymity itself is depicted as a weapon with which to resist state-
based and commercial data-collection and thus preserve the capacity to organize collective action 
and hold monopolies of force in check. It is thus represented as inherently democratic in both a 
participatory and a civil-liberties sense. Although there had previously been attempts to 
criminalize traffic using these networks, the equation of anonymizing mechanisms with fraud and 
other crime became much more common after Snowden – witness the high-profile legal action 
against Silk Road and the reputed subjection of TOR users to general surveillance, thus creating an 
impression of deviancy. As Helen Nissenbaum pointed out early on in regard to the hacker 
community, the contested ontology of cyberspace brings with it massive shifts in the normative 
evaluation of communication-practices even in cases where these practices themselves change little 
(Nissenbaum 2004). 
Apart from the debate as to whether the pursuit of anonymity is more criminal or more 
emancipatory in character, much discussion has taken place in the technological domain about the 
actual feasibility of anonymity. Even individuals (such as Jonathan Zittrain – 2009) who are 
sympathetic to early Internet values have asked whether the communication-related ideals 
inherent in the Internet’s architecture are applicable in relation to a multi-purpose infrastructure 
that is no longer the preserve of a restricted technical community. 
To sum up: in the technical domain, de-legitimization discourses are on the rise but technical elites 
have remained firmly on the side of anonymous communication and have come up with a number 
of technical innovations for preserving anonymity. Because these are mostly geared to individual 
self-defence, often reduce ease-of-use and entail regular checks and updates, their operation is 
restricted to a small group of technically literate elites. Nevertheless, these tools and mechanisms 
are of crucial importance and technical elites have succeeded in developing a political voice that 
commands a degree of attention. All in all, though, the impact of these endeavours is tempered by 
developments in other sectors. 
The Economic Domain 
In the economic domain, anonymity is, as it were, a latecomer and still ‘under construction’. On 
the face of it, this is surprising, given the importance of anonymity in classical liberal theory. Here, 
markets are assumed to operate anonymously and identification is regarded as unnecessary (or 
indeed likely to disrupt proper functioning), since goods can be exchanged by means of a 
mediation technique (money) that makes it irrelevant who is doing the buying and selling. In 
addition, modern economies are still viewed as being centred on markets and acquire much of 
their legitimacy by linking market exchange to the idea of freedom. The success of that linkage 
depends, in its turn, on the market’s being non-discriminatory – because anonymously structured. 
The digital turn has clearly not resulted in the abandonment of the idea of markets. What it has 
done, rather, is reinforce a number of trends in capitalist economics that were already at work in 
post-industrialist societies generally – the increased personalization of products, for example, the 
localization of offers and the re-centring of economies as a whole on services rather than 
manufacturing. In this context, anonymity emerges as an obstacle to be overcome. The approach 
to this problem has not been to try to discredit anonymity but to highlight the virtues of identity 
and identification. Services have become increasingly personalized, the prime example of this 
being social networking. Advertising, data-mining and (because digital goods are easy to produce 
and can be duplicated virtually cost-free) identifying promising Web-based business-opportunities 
have become core activities. This process – particularly the shift from acquisition to right of use – 
has fostered the development and imposition of identificatory mechanisms and classifications. 
The gradual disappearance of options for anonymous communication brought about by the 
changing behaviour of commercial players has been attracting the attention of privacy advocates 
for quite some time (and lately also that of law-makers). However, although these actors have 
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vigorously condemned the kind of all-encompassing data-collection pursued by business, they 
have mostly done so without referring to anonymity as such. Discussion here has generally taken 
place under the rubrics of data-protection, the responsible use of data and data-minimization. 
Privacy not anonymity is the rallying cry. So, whilst there is, and always has been, a powerful anti-
consumerist critique of the commercial Internet, the argument is about collective goods and 
control of information and not about options for anonymous communication. 
The Legal Domain 
Because the issue of anonymity crops up in connection with many of the fundamental rights of 
liberal democracy, it comes across, legally speaking, as a complex and persistent problem. 
Constitutionally, attempts have been made both to establish an abstract right to anonymity and to 
ban it (Froomkin 1999; Kerr et al. 2009; Farrall 2012). 
Discourse in the legal sphere is more nuanced than in the others discussed here. In relation to 
digital issues, debates about recognizing anonymity as a right, or banning it, tend to develop out of 
specific contexts. Thus, the critique of copyright-enforcement led to a discussion about legal 
responsibility in the context of peer-to-peer networks and cloud storage (Megaupload comes to 
mind) and this in turn triggered a debate about anonymity and the necessity of identification. 
State-based attempts to secure de-anonymization have included a push to data-retention, with 
anonymity being framed as an obstacle to the application of the law (or to the prevention of its 
violation). These moves have been countered with a fierce defence of data-protection and the right 
to ‘informational self-determination’. 
In the legal discourse overall, those who support (qualified) rights to anonymity appear to be 
winning the argument. In regard to copyright infringement and data-retention at least, a 
significant proportion of the relevant publics in democratic societies have become sceptical about 
proposals for an outright ban on anonymous communications. (Of course, this does not mean that 
the supporters of anonymity have won the political argument: discursive framing does not 
translate directly into political power.) A link has been established between privacy and anonymity 
and courts often regard the latter to be an appropriate means of protecting the former (perhaps a 
naïve view, given the discussions in the technological domain). 
Even if legal battles are being won, however, and the democratic rationale appears to be allowing a 
degree of space for anonymity, for privacy advocates to focus solely on these battles is a risky and 
limited strategy. Risky because when it comes to the law, the attempt to achieve a balance between 
privacy rights, property rights and the claims of sovereign actors to control may not always end in 
victory for the champions of privacy; and limited because the kinds of legal tactics involved can 
only be applied to certain issues and because the use of legal instruments will be a route opted for 
chiefly by well-resourced players. 
The Socio-Political Domain 
Coming finally to the general political and social domain, we find that many of the arguments 
from the other three areas also make an appearance here. The issue of anonymity has begun to 
excite interest and has been taken up by the mass media. The way it is framed in the public 
discourse continues to be more negative than positive, emphasizing the risks which anonymous 
communication brings with it and the anti-social behaviour it is expected to engender. Attention is 
focused on the horizontal dimension and on the harm that can be done to private individuals in 
situations of direct interaction. 
The main triggers to the public debate about anonymity have been bad digital practices (such as 
cyber-bullying and hate-speech) and the exposure of certain state activities. Whilst the view in 
favour of anonymous communication is a minority one, the coalition of those espousing it is 
broad, extending from left-wing protest-groups to defenders of civil liberties. Although activists 
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often claim that not enough attention is paid to the arguments about anonymity and that there is 
little awareness of the problems that lie ahead, issues relating to anonymity, privacy and 
surveillance have undoubtedly gained considerable traction in the public sphere and have 
graduated from niche concern to major political battleground. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The scope and diversity of discourse in these different areas is proof of the speed with which the 
debate on anonymity is evolving. Arguments on both sides – for and against anonymity – have 
become much more sophisticated and anonymity itself is now an object of political contestation 
rather than a minor determinant of modern life. Although politicization is clearly underway and 
alternative approaches for dealing with the changes entrained by digitalization are being 
developed, one can already foresee that establishing the connection between privacy and 
democracy, winning a legal battle or two and developing tools that enable us to stay one step ahead 
of the identifiers will not be enough to reverse the powerful trend towards de-anonymization. The 
forces driving us towards identification are to an extent isolated from public debate and shifting 
sensitivities. Hence politicization is a necessary step but not a sufficient one. To govern privacy 
effectively, we need to come up with configurations that allow society to retain the option of 
anonymity. Neither individual action (such as boycotting Facebook or the Internet as a whole) nor 
the imposition of strict laws will do the trick. Instead, we need to radically rethink the way the 
Internet is governed and develop responsive ways of building a global digital infrastructure. The 
goal should be an institutional set-up that facilitates the translation of public opinion into respon-
sible policy and is robust enough to keep capitalist dynamics and governmental logic in check. 
Rather than following the usual procedure in such cases and investing all hope in the centralized 
logic of sovereign states, consideration should be given to the creation of transnational decision-
making forums that would take into account all the different debates about the benefits and risks of 
our digital world, and the transformations being wrought within it. The ongoing politicization of 
major issues affecting digital societies – as traced in the present paper – impels us to consider 
strong and innovative modes of governance for privacy. Fine-tuning these schemes and setting 
them on the road to political realization is the task of civil society and democratic politics. 
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